Under the Sea: The Case For Exporting Submarine   
Technology To Taiwan

By Vance Trefethen

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Taiwan is like David staring into the face of the Communist China Goliath. They’re asking the United States for a few stones to put in their sling. Please join us as we affirm that: The United States federal government should substantially reform its trade policy with one or more of the following nations: China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan.

OBSERVATION 1. We offer the following DEFINITIONS.

**Trade**: “: the activity or process of buying, selling, or exchanging goods or services” (*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, copyright 2015* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trade*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trade)*)*

**Policy**: “a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body” (*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, copyright 2015* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy))

**Reform**: “to put or change into an improved form or condition” (*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, copyright 2015* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reform*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reform)*)*

OBSERVATION 2. We offer 2 key FACTS

FACT 1. Submarine request blocked. Taiwan’s greatest need is submarines, but the Obama Administration is blocking

Franz Stefan Gady 2014 (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Analyst at EastWest Institute ) 13 Mar 2015 THE DIPLOMAT Will the United States Help Taiwan Build Submarines? <http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-the-united-states-help-taiwan-build-submarines/>

Today, the chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Ed Royce, is beginning a three day visit to Taipei for talks over a wide range of issues, including future arms sales. According to the [Taipei Times](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/03/13/2003613447" \t "_blank), arms talks are likely to concentrate on requested U.S. technical aid for domestic submarines. “Royce is thought to favor helping with the submarines, but without support from U.S. President Barack Obama, the legislators have limited power in this area,” the newspaper notes. In 2001, the Bush administration agreed to help Taiwan acquire or produce eight [diesel-electric submarines](http://www.nti.org/glossary/diesel-electric-submarine/" \t "_blank), yet so far the United States has proven reluctant to fulfill its pledge. A January 2015 report by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) notes that the United States continues to stall on the request for submarines by stating that it is “still under cross-agency review” by officials.  This stalling tactic has been severely criticized by a few former U.S. officials, like Bob Dole, who [emphasized](http://www.realdailybuzz.com/rdb.nsf/DocView?Open&UNID=87ff7b0d1b1faf1a85257dc1000922c1" \t "_blank) that “Taiwan’s greatest need is new submarines.”

FACT 2. Technology lacking. Taiwan can’t build submarines without US technology

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 2013. Taiwan Submarine Import and Export Behavior 22 July 2013 <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/taiwan-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/>

While there is little doubt that the island country could join the ranks of [South Korea](http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-korea/), [Turkey](http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/turkey/), Greece, [India](http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/india/), [Pakistan](http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/), [Australia](http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/australia/) and other under-license submarine-producing countries, an indigenous program would run into difficulties over crucial technologies, especially command and combat systems. Since it is unlikely that Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Australia, which ruled out direct and indirect submarine sales to Taiwan, will change their export policies, Taiwan would still have to rely on U.S. companies to supply the aforementioned systems. [30] In 2012, the CSBC Chairman argued that his company had the capacity to build the submarine platforms, but Taiwan would still have to acquire weapons and communications systems from abroad.

OBSERVATION 3. We offer the following PLAN, to be implemented by Congress and the President

1. Congress votes to lift all restrictions on export of non-nuclear submarines, submarine parts, and submarine technology to Taiwan.   
2. The President authorizes the export of any of these items to Taiwan subject to the condition that they cannot be re-exported to any other country.  
3. Enforcement through the President. Any violations will end cooperation and export licensing.   
4. Funding through existing budgets of existing agencies  
5. Plan takes effect 3 days after an Affirmative ballot.  
6. All Affirmative speeches may clarify.

OBSERVATION 4. JUSTIFICATIONS

JUSTIFICATION 1. Strategic benefits. We see this in 2 sub-points

A. Strategic benefits justify Taiwan submarines

Ian Easton & Randall Schriver 2014. (Easton – master’s degree in China studies; research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute; former visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo; formerly worked as a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses. Schriver – master’s degree in public policy; President and CEO of the Project 2049 Institute; senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) Dec 2014 STANDING WATCH - Taiwan and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Western Pacific <http://www.project2049.net/documents/141216_Taiwan_Maritime_Domain_Awareness_Easton_Schriver.pdf>

Washington should clearly signal to Taiwan and the U.S. defense industry its intention to approve licensing for American industrial participation in Taiwan’s indigenous defense submarine program. In addition to other missions, such as ASW and anti-surface operations, submarines are a critical part of an integrated intelligence architecture. The strategic benefits of new diesel-electric submarines and the range of missions they could undertake as part of coalition operations, merit full U.S. support for whatever submarine program Taiwan decides to pursue.

B. Taiwan and US national defense improve

Dean Cheng 2015 (Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs; formerly worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute; formerly studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program) Why Taiwan Needs Submarines 12 Jan 2015 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

Taiwan’s defense would be strengthened with more modern submarines. The U.S., as Taiwan’s best, and often only, friend, should help Taipei acquire an underwater force, which would benefit not only Taiwan, but America’s defense posture in the western Pacific. To this end, the United States should provide options that enable Taiwan to meet its requirements in the most cost-effective way possible.

JUSTIFICATION 2. PRC Aggression. We see this in 2 sub-points

A. The Link: No red line. The Obama Administration’s reduction of arms for Taiwan weakens deterrence against China

*Julien Canin 2014. (has worked with both the French Political Party UMP on foreign and defense issues and with the French Ministry of Defense; received a French law degree and a master's degree from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles , Belgium) 23 Oct 2014* THE US, TAIWAN AND ITS DEFENSE: THE MISSING ARMS EXPORTS <http://www.operationnels.com/2014/10/23/the-us-taiwan-and-its-defense-the-missing-arms-exports/>

There is a clear danger posed by Obama Administration’s slow rolling of Taiwan on arms exports, namely the PRC could see this as part of a broader global policy of hesitation and uncertainty seen in Ukraine, the “red line” in Syria, the response to Benghazi, etc and misinterpret what the US would do in the case of PRC aggression against Taiwan. In other words, arms sales to Taiwan is no longer a parochial issue it is part of a broader deterrence policy towards the PRC and its global policies.

B. The Impact: Survival at stake. Submarines are key to the defense of Taiwan

Dean Cheng 2015 (Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs; formerly worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute; formerly studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program) Why Taiwan Needs Submarines 12 Jan 2015 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

Because of the disparity in physical size, economy, and geography, Taiwan’s maritime security in the face of the Chinese threat is a challenging problem. China has the wherewithal to simultaneously bombard Taiwan (especially with its large arsenal of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles), while also being able to deploy forces farther afield of Taiwan’s immediate environment. For Taipei, the key to a successful defense of the island is to hold out long enough for the United States to intervene decisively. Taiwan’s military must therefore be able to simultaneously defend the island, while also nonetheless being able to deny the Chinese regime the ability to easily or rapidly isolate the island. Submarines have long played a role in Taiwan’s defense calculations. Given the relative weakness of China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, submarines would pose a significant threat to any amphibious force. Indeed, the record of the British Royal Navy during the Falklands would suggest a disproportionate effect from even a handful of modern submarines.

JUSTIFICATION 3. Business opportunities.

US defense contractors will find multiple business opportunities working with Taiwan on submarines

J. Michael Cole 2014 (s*enior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on Contemporary China in Taipei* ) 22 Oct 2014 From Gunboats to Nuts and Bolts <http://thinking-taiwan.com/from-gunboats-to-nuts-and-bolts/>

Furthermore, Taiwan will need help from abroad. Though advanced, the island’s private defense industries and high-tech sectors have longstanding limitations, as efforts to build an indigenous submarine have made all too clear. As such, an indigenous defense strategy will require Taipei to recruit foreign engineers for development and systems integration. There are precedents for this, as with development of the AIDC F-CK-1 Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) and the F-16A/B upgrade program. Although major U.S. defense firms such as Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman might no longer reap billions of dollars selling complete military systems to Taiwan, the opportunities for cooperation with Taiwan’s defense sector — through engineering assistance or the production of components (e.g., launchers, fire control systems, radar, et cetera) to be integrated in Taiwan — will multiply. What’s more, the U.S. government might be more amenable to this sort of behind-the-scenes cooperation than to the kind of high profile, multi-billion-dollar sale of finished equipment that will likely cause it problems with Beijing.

2A Evidence: Taiwan Submarine Technology

TOPICALITY

Significance: What the US does about submarines is Taiwan’s most important defense issue today

Wendell Minnick 2015 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 27 May 2015 DEFENSE NEWS Taiwan Pushes for New Weapons on All Fronts <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/05/27/taiwan-requirements-submarine-frigate-destroyer-helicopter-budget-china/26860647/>

Arguably the most important defense issue is what the US government decides to do about Taiwan's long-pending submarine requirement. First approved by the George W. Bush administration in 2001, the program has been stalled for 14 years by political, budgetary and technological woes. US support remains vital if Taiwan is to replace its fleet of obsolete World War II-era Guppy II boats and rapidly aging Dutch-built Zwaardvis Mk 2 boats acquired in the 1980s.

INHERENCY

US promised Taiwan submarines in 2001, but no action has been taken. All Taiwan has are old relics

Dean Cheng 2015 (Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs; formerly worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute; formerly studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program) Why Taiwan Needs Submarines 12 Jan 2015 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

In 2001, President George W. Bush’s Administration agreed to a major arms sale to Taiwan. Approved for sale to Taipei were anti-submarine warfare aircraft, anti-ship missiles, self-propelled howitzers, minesweepers, and destroyers. The United States also agreed to help Taiwan obtain new diesel-electric submarines, to modernize the island’s underwater forces. At the time, the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) had two ex-Dutch Zwaardvis-class boats, built in the 1980s, and two ex-U.S. Navy Guppy-class boats built at the end of World War II. Thirteen years later, Taiwan’s submarine arm still consists of two ex-Dutch submarines and two boats most of whose peers are now museum exhibits. Years of on-again, off-again discussions have not resulted in an actual sale from the United States or any other nation. More seriously, there has also been no movement in facilitating American shipwrights’ and experts’ engagement with their Taiwanese counterparts to allow Taiwan to build its own boats.

Taiwan requested technology export approval in 2006 but the US State Department has taken no action

Dean Cheng 2015 (Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs; formerly worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute; formerly studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program) Why Taiwan Needs Submarines 12 Jan 2015 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

In 2006, Richard Lawless, then the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, indicated that the United States was open to a two-phase approach to explore the possibility of indigenous production of diesel-electric submarines by Taiwan. The first phase would involve determining a design for these boats, while the second would involve actual construction and subsequent operations and maintenance. A formal congressional notification for the first phase was prepared in early 2008, but it has remained in the State Department with no movement in the subsequent six years.

Obama Administration not yet helping Taiwan acquire submarines – right now they have reservations

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/>

As for the U.S., whether Obama will help Taiwan acquire submarines in defiance of Chinese opposition is uncertain. Certainly, Washington’s desire to maintain strategic superiority in the Asia-Pacific creates some reservations about transferring cutting-edge submarine technologies to Taiwan. For now, then, the type of submarines Taiwan ultimately acquires remains an open question.

“Taiwan can build subs with their own technology” – Response: They don’t have the experience and it would be too expensive

Dean Cheng 2015 (Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs; formerly worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute; formerly studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program) Why Taiwan Needs Submarines 12 Jan 2015 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

When the submarine program was nonetheless not included in the September 2011 arms sales notification to Congress, Taiwan began to explore the possibility of completely indigenous design and manufacturing. Bringing together elements from Taiwan’s military, major shipbuilders, and key design centers, a Taiwanese task force produced a submarine program feasibility study. This led to a plan, forwarded to the Taiwan legislature in October 2014, whereby Taiwan’s own Ship and Ocean Industries Research and Development Center would design the vessels, China Shipbuilding Corporation would manufacture the boats, and the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology would provide the key weapons and sensors. Unfortunately, such a program would cost some $4.9 billion for the first four vessels. This would consume a significant portion of Taiwan’s overall defense budget. Nor would this address the reality that Taiwan’s shipbuilders have no experience building a submarine, which entails working with specialized steel and integrating a variety of sensors and weapons in ways very different from surface combatants. Yet, given the lack of progress on the American side in fulfilling its prior commitment, and the unwillingness of European nations to risk antagonizing Beijing, it is understandable why Taiwan would choose this option since it has no other real choices.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

Taiwan still wants US submarine technology

Jane’s Defence Weekly 2015 (journalist Gavin Phipps) 6 Jan 2015 Taiwan MND says US support on subs, F-16s limited by concerns about Chinese response <http://www.janes.com/article/47651/taiwan-mnd-says-us-support-on-subs-f-16s-limited-by-concerns-about-chinese-response>

According to the report, US reluctance to provide the island with submarines has forced the MND to "integrate domestic shipbuilding capabilities with foreign assistance" to build an indigenous submarine fleet. The MND announced approval of a four-year design contract for an indigenous submarine on 29 December 2014. It is due to start in 2016. Taiwanese officials have said the country is still seeking Washington's assistance with technology transfers and the sale of equipment for the build stage.

“Someone in Taiwan is blocking / dropping submarine plan” – Response: Taiwan military is actively pushing for submarines

WASHINGTON TIMES 2014 (journalist Bill Gertz) 29 Oct 2014 ‘No one has the guts to sell submarines to Taiwan’ as China pressures Pentagon <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/29/inside-the-ring-taiwan-submarine-plan-sinks-as-pen/?page=all> (brackets in original)

“Our determination to build indigenous submarines is very firm. The navy is very actively pushing this matter,” said Maj. Gen. **David Lo**, a spokesman for[Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/)’s Ministry of National Defense. “The [Republic of China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/) [[Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/)] will not engage in an arms race with [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/). We hope to acquire submarines to strengthen our self-defense,” he said, according to Reuters.

US should allow submarine technology exports and cooperation with Taiwan

Dean Cheng 2015 (Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs; formerly worked for 13 years as a senior analyst, first with Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), the Fortune 500 specialist in defense and homeland security, and then with the China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses, the federally funded research institute; formerly studied China's defense-industrial complex for a congressional agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, as an analyst in the International Security and Space Program) Why Taiwan Needs Submarines 12 Jan 2015 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/01/why-taiwan-needs-submarines>

It is in U.S. security interests to ensure that Taiwan maintains a sufficiently robust defense that it can deter Chinese aggression, especially as China has become increasingly assertive throughout the East Asian littoral in recent years. The relatively quiet state of the Taiwan Straits may well change after the 2016 Taiwan presidential elections, particularly given likely Chinese reaction to a Democratic Progressive Party victory. Recent Chinese actions toward Hong Kong have probably torpedoed any prospect of the “one country, two systems” approach that Beijing has long proffered to Taiwan. The United States should:  
 Allow the “Conception Definition and Design Source Selection” phase to proceed promptly.Congress should direct the Department of State to either allow this to move forward, or provide a formal explanation on why it is failing to do so.  
 Allow American shipbuilders and weapons manufacturers to cooperate with Taiwanese corporations in assessing Taiwan’s capabilities and forward bids on relevant sensors and weapons systems. At the same time, the U.S. should also allow the sale of additional submarine weapons (e.g., submarine-launched Harpoon missiles) that are already in the Taiwanese inventory.  
 Continue to encourage other manufacturers of conventional (diesel-electric) submarines to cooperate with Taiwan. The prospect of Japan engaging in arms sales, and specifically the export of submarines to Australia, raises the possibility of additional, non-traditional suppliers who might be additional sources of either submarine technology, or even completed boats.

“US shipyards don’t build diesel subs any more” – Response: Dutch company RDM has offered to produce them in US shipyards for export to Taiwan

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 2013. Taiwan Submarine Import and Export Behavior 22 July 2013 <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/taiwan-submarine-import-and-export-behavior/>

Under pressure to find buyers for both its used Zwaardvis- and new Moray-class boats, RDM continues to be accommodating, offering to transfer blueprints and allow licensed production at U.S. yards for eventual export to Taiwan. The Dutch government has repeatedly expressed its strict adherence to a "one China" policy, excepting however, the export of any submarine related material with Taiwan as the end user.

“US doesn’t build diesel subs any more” – Response: We can get them from Japan and share the technology

William Lowther 2014 (journalist) TAIPEI TIMES 17 Sept 2014 Submarine sales to Taiwan ‘improbable’: US council <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/09/17/2003599903>

Senior fellow on Asian military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC) Richard Fisher strongly disagreed with a number of Dickey’s arguments. He said the US was not limited to US nuclear submarine technology. “The US developed the Barbel Class conventional submarine in the late 1950s and it was so advanced that it became the basis for Japan’s early classes of submarines. Washington could purchase Japan’s advanced version of the Barbel on behalf of Taiwan,” Fisher said. Fisher said the US was the principal subcontractor for Australia’s Collins-class submarines, supplying combat systems. Washington could assist Taiwan’s current submarine plans in the same way, he said.

Dickey is wrong: Taiwan can afford submarines – they’ve scaled back the designs to make it cheaper, and well worth it

William Lowther 2014 (journalist) TAIPEI TIMES 17 Sept 2014 Submarine sales to Taiwan ‘improbable’: US council <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/09/17/2003599903>

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JUSTIFICATIONS

Strategy / Security

Helping with Taiwan submarines would boost Taiwan military morale and avoid harm to US strategy in the region

J. Michael Cole 2015 (s*enior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on Contemporary China in Taipei)* Taiwan: Between the pivot and a hard place 30 JAN 2015 <https://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2015/01/30/taiwan-between-the-pivot-and-a-hard-place/>

The growing sentiment that it is being left behind can have serious ramifications for morale within the Taiwanese military and society in general. Given that Taiwan probably does have a role to play in the U.S. rebalancing (intelligence sharing comes to mind), decision makers in Washington would be encouraged to better understand the extent to which this demoralization is detrimental to U.S. efforts within the region—for one thing, a weakened Taiwanese military could conceivably invite Chinese military adventurism or facilitate [penetration by the PRC intelligence apparatus](http://thinking-taiwan.com/two-ways-of-looking-at-a-spy/" \t "_blank)—and what remedial measures can be adopted to mitigate the problem. A new round of arms sales to Taiwan, which is currently going through [the longest period without a notification to Congress on new defense articles since the early 1990s](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf" \t "_blank), would undoubtedly serve as a morale booster. In this regard, the [transfer of decommissioned warships](http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/to-buy-or-not-to-buy-a-dilemma-for-taiwans-navy/" \t "_blank) is not significant enough to play that symbolic role; something more substantial, such as combat aircraft or agreement to assist Taiwan with its development of indigenous submarines, would have better chances of having such an effect.

Submarines would allow Taiwan to enhance regional stability and US interests in the region

WASHINGTON TIMES 2014 (journalist Bill Gertz) 29 Oct 2014 ‘No one has the guts to sell submarines to Taiwan’ as China pressures Pentagon <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/29/inside-the-ring-taiwan-submarine-plan-sinks-as-pen/?page=all> (brackets in original)

“Like other navies in the region, [Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/) appears poised to contribute toward U.S. interests in regional security,” said [Mark Stokes](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/mark-stokes/), a former [Pentagon](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/pentagon/) official who worked on [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) affairs. “[Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/)’s acquisition of new diesel electric submarines would enhance regional stability by providing a clear deterrent to potential [Chinese] force and interruption of sea lines of communication in the East China Sea, South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.”

China Threat

China’s refusal to renounce force to resolve Taiwan issues is the main cause of tension today

US-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute 2012. (US-Taiwan Business Council is a non-profit, member-based organization dedicated to developing the trade and business relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Members consist of public and private companies with business interests in Taiwan. Project 2049 Institute seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s mid-point. The organization fills a gap in the public policy realm through forward-looking, region-specific research on alternative security and policy solutions ) Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales <https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAAahUKEwit1LrTg43GAhVCbhQKHZ4QAGM&url=http%3A%2F%2Fproject2049.net%2Fdocuments%2F2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf&ei=A1J8Ve3GIcLcUZ6hgJgG&usg=AFQjCNE98LZGMtn_vXXJIYsqFNfxzKgPlg&sig2=YlFyhUXuXJRzF8CfbpFNqQ&bvm=bv.95515949,d.d24>

The PRC’s refusal to renounce use of force to resolve its political differences with Taiwan remains the principal obstacle in reducing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. An end to the state of hostility between the two sides of the Strait would also require a tangible decrease in the nature of the military threat that Chinese authorities and the military force under their control pose to the people on Taiwan and their democratically elected leadership. Overall trends in cross-Strait relations make continued reliance on implicit or explicit use of military force increasingly outdated and even counterproductive.

****Chinese missiles justify arming Taiwan, including submarines. If China wants reduced arms sales, they should de-escalate****

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The single most important factor in alienating the people of Taiwan, and thereby a large factor in encouraging independence sentiments, is the PRC’s coercive military posture opposite Taiwan. If it truly desired a reduction in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the PRC would begin substantive reductions in its own military posture. This would have to include redeployment or closure of conventional SRBM [short range ballistic missile] and MRBM [medium range ballistic missile] brigades opposite Taiwan, along with the dismantling of static infrastructure supporting missile operations – such as rail transfer points and brigade/base-level underground missile assembly/checkout centers. Removal of the missiles has been an important issue both under Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou and his predecessor, President Chen Shui-bian. The Ma administration has explicitly established the removal of the SRBMs opposite Taiwan as a pre-condition for initiation of political negotiations that could potentially lead to a cross-Strait peace agreement. Barring a substantive reduction in the Chinese military posture opposite Taiwan, the U.S. should – and most likely will – continue to provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character, as mandated under the TRA. Key issues currently on the table include an outstanding request for additional F-16C/Ds and a Congressional notification for a diesel-electric submarine design program valued at US$360 million.

Big risk from Chinese naval capabilities – they are preparing for a military conflict

William Lowther 2015 (journalist) US analyst urges Japan to sell Taiwan submarines, TAIPEI TIMES 7 Feb 2015 <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/02/07/2003611010> (brackets added)

Mazza’s study followed testimony by US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall before a hearing of the US House Armed Services Committee that China’s military modernization had undermined US superiority. “We’re at risk and the situation is getting worse,” Kendall said. Earlier this week, the former intelligence chief of the US Navy’s Pacific Fleet, Captain James Fanell, said in Honolulu that Beijing was “rejuvenating” and preparing for a military conflict. “China’s rise, if left unchecked or undeterred, will necessarily disrupt the peace and stability of our friends, partners and allies,” Fanell told the Washington Free Beacon Web site.

US arms sales are key to Taiwan’s survival as a free and democratic state

*Julien Canin 2014. (has worked with both the French Political Party UMP on foreign and defense issues and with the French Ministry of Defense; received a French law degree and a master's degree from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles , Belgium) 23 Oct 2014* THE US, TAIWAN AND ITS DEFENSE: THE MISSING ARMS EXPORTS <http://www.operationnels.com/2014/10/23/the-us-taiwan-and-its-defense-the-missing-arms-exports/>

Nobody can deny the rise of tensions in East and Southeast Asia, most of the neighbors of China being on alert about its assertiveness in territorial claims, especially Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. But in spite of this posture, the cross-Strait relations are currently relatively peaceful. Since the 2008’s election of the KMT’s candidate Ma Ying-jeou and his policy of the “Three No’s” (no unification, no independence, no use of force), and his strategy of “economy first, politics later; easy things first, difficult things later”, atmosphere between the two states has warmed. About ten official talks have been held and some twenty agreements were signed, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010 and the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in June 2013 – but still not ratified by the Taiwanese legislature – about free trade and liberalization of service sector. However, as stated by a Taiwanese Proverb, “Something that looks good does not necessarily taste good.” With the military option for reunification on the table until China officially renounces to use it for recover the 23rd Chinese province, Taiwan has to preserve and increase its military capabilities. **From this perspective, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, beyond to be an indicator of the American commitment to preserve the stability in the Asia-Pacific region, will be the best possible way of ensuring the preservation of the lone capability which, in last resort, will guarantee the survival of Taiwan as free and democratic state.**

****Taiwan subs would defend against Chinese amphibious attack****

**Sam LaGrone 2015 ( journalist) 2 Jan 2015** Taiwan Kicks Off Domestic Attack Sub Program <http://news.usni.org/2015/01/02/taiwan-kicks-off-domestic-attack-sub-program>

The [planned result would be around four SSKs](http://news.usni.org/2013/11/13/asias-submarine-race) to replace the island’s current boats — two Dutch-built, 1980s vintage 2,600-ton Hai-lang-class SSKs and two World War II era U.S. Guppy-class boats used for training. “At present the navy’s demand is submarines ranging from 1,200-3,000 tons,” Vice Adm. Hsiao Wei-min with the Republic of China Navy (RoCN) told the legislator on Monday. The new boats are a long awaited hedge against the expansion of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the looming threat of an amphibious assault from the mainland. “After Taiwan has lost air and sea control, it’s the subs that will still be able to attack groups of amphibious landing aircraft,” Wang Jyh-perng, RoCN reserve captain [told](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF01Ad01.html" \t "_blank) the Asia Times in 2011.

Submarines would be effective at defending Taiwan against Chinese threat

*Richard D. Fisher Jr. 2014 (senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center) 23 Oct 2014* WASHINGTON TIMES Submarines, made in Taiwan <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/23/fisher-submarines-made-in-taiwan/>

By any consideration, Taiwan seeks a modest submarine fleet to provide a deterrent force. It is not meant to go sub-to-sub with the 65 to 73 diesel- and nuclear-powered subs [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) may have by 2020, according the most recent annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Still, four to eight submarines could complicate [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/)’s real goal of amassing an amphibious army force sufficient to invade [Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/). [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/)’s invasion plans envision using up to 12 new, large naval amphibious-assault ships, and scores of new, very large civilian roll-on, roll-off ferry ships. [Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/)’s submarines could effectively threaten these ships and force [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) to reconsider future invasion plans.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Hurts relations with China” – Response: Taiwan arms sales can improve relations. Example: F-16 sales in ‘92

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Quite the contrary, while recent history has proven that Beijing’s reprobations appears to be focused on the supply side, the U.S., rather than on the demand side (Taiwan), these sales should sustain peace development on both sides of the Strait, Taiwan feeling more confident in engagement with PRC, not being in an unbalanced position, and preventing it from any further deterioration. An illustration can be found in the F-16 sales’ announcement in 1992, at the time, a highly comparable sensitive’s issue that the today F-35 sales could be [quoting the US-Taiwan Business Council and Project 2049 Institute]: In the immediate afterglow of the U.S. F-16 announcement, cross-Strait ties also began to warm considerably. A month after the announcement, and thus confident of U.S. backing, representatives from Taiwan met in Hong Kong with their counterparts from China. There, the two sides achieved a major breakthrough in agreeing to put aside differences over the definition of “One China.”

“China retaliation” – Response: China retaliation for Taiwan arms sales would not be effective nor long lasting

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The responses from PRC [People’s Republic of China] vary in a wide range of actions, from diplomatic protest, i.e. recall or withdrawal of the PRC ambassador in Washington or breaking off talks in certain domains, to public protest through mass media. Retaliation against U.S. economic interests in China could be limited by externals incentives: the necessity to preserve the image of the country as a reliable trade partner vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and the capability for the U.S. to sue China in front of the World Trade Organization, which disposes a jurisdiction in this domain and could impose binding decisions in order to end the infringement. Finally, Beijing could use implicit threats to release sensitive missile or nuclear technology to Iran or North Korea in retaliation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. However, this choice would be criticized not just by U.S. but also by the majority of the countries, the international community being concerned by the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction. Eventually for Beijing, this path will be excessively expensive compared to the object of these retaliations, the price to win being worst than the profit of these sanctions. As largely debated during the September conference, the skill of the U.S. officials to keep these subjects in the twilight zone will prevent this kind of retaliations to China, actions which, in the past, have not been long lasting.

“China would sanction US defense contractors” – Response: They threaten, but in fact they never do it

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Following a routine PAC-3-related contract announcement in December 2009, a PLA National Defense University academic publicly advocated imposing sanctions against U.S. companies engaged in Taiwan arms sales. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to have adopted the implied threat and singled out a U.S. company by name in statements referencing the 2009 contract.Nevertheless, there is no solid evidence to date that China has followed through on these threats toward U.S. defense contractors – threats made most recently after the January 2010 arms package was released. Indeed, each of the companies mentioned in this context at that time all saw their commercial interests in China expand in the two quarters following the 2010 notification.

“China economic retaliation” – Response: WTO would solve

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In addition, if a U.S. company faces discrimination in China as a result of sanctions stemming from Taiwan arms sales, such a case could certainly be introduced to the WTO for adjudication. This would be especially true if the company was participating in a free and open government competition in China. The PRC would then be compelled to justify any substantive sanctions on national security grounds, presumably arguing their case based on the notion that Taiwan is an integral part of China and that arms sales are a threat to Chinese national interests and territorial integrity. However, Beijing likely understands that international law is not on its side when it comes to Taiwan sovereignty issues.

“Risk of war with China” – Response: Turn – erosion of Taiwan’s military capabilities increases risk of war

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The potential for PRC coercive use of force to resolve political differences with Taiwan has been the primary flash point in the region and likely will remain so for the foreseeable future. A relative erosion of Taiwan’s military capabilities could create opportunities and incentives for Beijing’s political and military leadership to assume greater risk in imposing their own agenda on cross-Strait relations, including resorting to force to resolve their difference with Taiwan. This is also the contingency that is most likely to bring the U.S. and China into armed conflict.

US arms sales aren’t hurting China/Taiwan relationship

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

The third piece of the puzzle is the Taiwan-China relationship – how have U.S. arms sales to Taiwan affected the cross-Strait dynamic? The answer to this question depends on which aspect of the relationship one is looking at. In terms of economic, trade and cultural relations, it seems abundantly clear that U.S. arms sales have, in any case, not impeded the robust and dramatic development of cross-Strait ties. I think it would be hard to make the case that there is causality between the arms sales and the development of cross-Strait relations, because one would have to control for many other factors in the equation, but it would be hard to contest the fact that cross-Strait ties have blossomed even as the United States has sold arms to Taiwan.

Not a big deal: US arms sales to Taiwan are a manageable irritant to China

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Private Chinese reaction to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has generally been more textured and nuanced than public reaction. Privately, Chinese experts recognize that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are mandated by U.S. law and that they are not going to stop anytime soon. These experts understand, though do not generally agree with, U.S. reasoning for the sales, but acknowledge that change will take time. They also wonder aloud whether U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are driven mostly by the commercial interests of defense contractors. But within broad parameters, they see U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a manageable irritant in China’s relationship with the United States and they don’t get as vexed about the issue as the Chinese government does at the official level.

Current policy on Taiwan has been successful at maintaining peace and allowing US-China relations to grow

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The architecture’s ambiguity contributes directly to its staying power and fairly consistent application over more than three decades – a second major strength. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the policy, whether one likes or dislikes it, the fact is, U.S. policy on Taiwan – as governed by the three-pronged policy architecture discussed above – has been remarkably consistent over five presidencies (Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Jr. and Obama) and across partisan lines in both the White House and in Congress. This staying power and consistency, coupled with the consistency of China’s doctrine and policies, has at least resulted in broad predictability surrounding cross-Strait military and security issues. Perhaps the most significant success of this architecture is that, whatever its weaknesses (to be discussed below), it has created a context within which Taiwan itself, China-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations have been able to develop and blossom despite profound differences between the sides over several major issues.

“Leak submarine technology to China” – Response: China already has nuclear and diesel submarines, so… what’s the problem?

*Richard D. Fisher Jr. 2014 (senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center) 23 Oct 2014* WASHINGTON TIMES Submarines, made in Taiwan <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/23/fisher-submarines-made-in-taiwan/>

By any consideration, [Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/) seeks a modest submarine fleet to provide a deterrent force. It is not meant to go sub-to-sub with the 65 to 73 diesel- and nuclear-powered subs [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) may have by 2020, according the most recent annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Still, four to eight submarines could complicate [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/)’s real goal of amassing an amphibious army force sufficient to invade [Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/). [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/)’s invasion plans envision using up to 12 new, large naval amphibious-assault ships, and scores of new, very large civilian roll-on, roll-off ferry ships. [Taiwan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/taiwan/)’s submarines could effectively threaten these ships and force [China](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/china/) to reconsider future invasion plans.

“Tension with China” – Response: Arms sales are a symptom, not the cause, of tensions, and are justified by the threat

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I understand why China objects to these sales as a matter of principle, but I believe that China does not fully appreciate or “own” the impact of its own actions on Taiwan threat perceptions and Taiwan and U.S. decision-making. Most fundamentally, unless and until the underlying issues in the China/Taiwan dispute are resolved, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue. Arms sales, while a significant factor in the cross-Strait military and security picture, are a symptom of the enduring tensions, not the root cause. It is within China’s and Taiwan’s power to generate a cross-Strait context in which lower levels of arms sales are viewed by Taiwan as necessary, but we are not there yet, and until we get there, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan make sense for the United States.

No stability threat: US arms sales are a stabilizing force in China/Taiwan relations

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This second recommendation flows naturally from the first. I regard U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as stabilizing and as a force for good for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations, at least when viewed from a U.S. (and Taiwan) perspective. I believe they should continue indefinitely at a robust level in the general range of recent years’ sales; any dramatic decrease in arms sales to Taiwan under current circumstances would, I think, be destabilizing and harmful to the interests of the United States. While it is often pointed out that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are mandated by law, it is also worth flagging that they are also explicitly permitted under the 1982 Joint Communique, to which China is a signatory.